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Abstract: The early literature on research contests stressed the advantages of a fixed 
prize in inspiring R&D effort.  More recently the focus has moved towards endogenizing 
the rewards to research activity in these tournament settings, since this can induce extra 
effort or enhance the surplus of the buyer.  We focus on a research contest as a means of 
selecting a partner for an R&D enterprise, in an informational setting in which the 
established providers of R&D services know more about each others’ relative capabilities 
than does the buyer/sponsor. This asymmetry creates a source of inefficiency if a rank 
order contest is used as a selection device; we show how the contest can be modified to 
improve selection efficiency, while maintaining its simplicity (as only ordinal 
information is required).  The modification that we suggest involves endogenizing the 
prizes that are awarded contingent upon whether a contestant wins or loses the contest.  
Furthermore, the payment system and the selection mechanism are detail free. 
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In the funding of commercial research and development (R&D) projects, payment 
structures have long been used that comprise a fixed fee and a payment contingent upon 
some pre-specified realization or event.  Windus and Schiffel (1976) present a summary 
of funding practice by public bodies in several countries in which a common element is a 
fixed level of funding, and a variable component comprising a proportion of the profit 
that the developing firm can keep in the event of a commercially viable innovation.  Early 
models of R&D contests involved a sponsor offering a fixed prize for an innovation 
(Taylor, 1995, and Fullerton and McAfee, 1999).  Recently there has been a move away 
from fixed-prize research contests, as advocated by Che and Gale (2003), who give the 
following examples of contests in which endogenous prizes have been used: (i) in the 
procurement of a high-speed train system in Korea, firms proposed designs and prices for 
these designs, (ii) grant competitions sponsored by the National Science Foundation, (iii) 
defense contractors often use R&D investments to produce prototypes, and then bid for 
the final production contract. 
The focus of this paper is how a simple endogenous prize research contest can be used by 
a buyer to select a partner for a R&D enterprise when there is asymmetric information.  
To be specific, consider a research contest in which a firm is seeking a partner in the 
development and subsequent marketing of a new product.  Selecting the correct partner 
for this venture would be an obvious aim here, but the established providers of R&D 
services are likely to know more about each others’ capabilities than a potential sponsor.  
Hence a contest may be instigated to gauge the suitability of different research 
laboratories for this task.  Our analysis presents a simple, detail-free method for selecting 
the most suitable partner by setting up the correct menu of rewards in a simple rank-order 
contract. A high quality partner is identified as requiring a larger fee (share of the profits) 
if it is successful in developing the new product, but will be willing to bear a larger 
proportion of the cost if unsuccessful than would a less able competitor.  Such cost-
sharing arrangements in R&D have long been in existence in several countries (see Keck, 
 4
1988). Fullerton et al. (2002) note that one benefit with a more flexible prize schedule is 
that the contest designer is then relieved of the burden of calculating the correct level of 
the fixed prize.1  In the context of military acquisitions, Fullerton (1995) has suggested 
that a contractor may submit a proposal that incorporates some element of an appropriate 
reward for his efforts; our analysis gives a formal basis for this proposal.    
Our work builds upon that of Che and Gale (2003) and Fullerton et al. (2002) who have 
analyzed models of research contests in which the prize for winning is set by means of an 
auction mechanism.  Firms compete in terms of the quality of their innovation and the 
price that they require for selling it, and the buyer’s aim in both of these models is to 
maximize his surplus.  The role of contests as an incentive device has been widely 
analyzed in the literature, especially relating to the internal labour market.2  In this paper, 
we concentrate on a contest as a selection device, in which the aim is to identify the best 
individual, firm, or research team for a specific task.  Indeed in much of the contest and 
tournament literature selection has not been an issue since participants are assumed to be 
symmetric ex ante so that the contest designer is indifferent as to the identity of the agent 
that wins the contest.  However, allocating the contest prize to the most suitable 
participant is an issue that arises in research contests, internal labour markets, and other 
applications.3 
A selection problem arises in a contest if the participants have different ability potential.  
Heterogeneity has been shown to disturb the contest as an incentive device, and may also 
                                                 
1 Judd et al. (2003) consider a patent race in which the patent granting authority can choose when to grant 
the patent and the size of the reward (through instruments such as patent length and breadth).  Our 
mechanism would relieve the authority of the second task. 
2 For example, Lazear and Rosen (1981), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), and Green and Stokey (1983); see 
also McLaughlin (1988), for an overview. Also later work on contest design, has had the maximization of 
revenue (or effort) as a goal: Moldovanu and Sela (2002) analyze contests in which the aim is to maximize 
total effort, or to maximize the highest individual effort, and Singh and Wittman (2001) consider a contest 
designer whose goal is the maximization of expected revenue. 
 
3 Gifford and Kenney (1986) represent an early attempt to highlight the role of contests in matching the 
correct worker to the correct task. They state that “Considerable information is needed for the correct 
placement of individuals in various labor market positions” (Gifford and Kenney, 1986; 305).  We show 
that this is not necessarily the case. Employee selection is also briefly touched upon in Lazear and Rosen 
(1981) and in O’Keeffe, Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1984); see also Meyer (1991). 
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disturb it as a selection device. 4  Lazear and Rosen (1981) and O’Keeffe, Viscusi and 
Zeckhauser (1984) demonstrate that a favourite often has weak incentives to exert effort 
if he faces an underdog due to the fact that he has good chances to win the contest even at 
a modest effort level. To reestablish the first best effort incentives, Lazear and Rosen 
(1981) consider handicapping, as well as a process of self-selection of contestants into 
different leagues or contests.  Handicapping is also used by Che and Gale (2003) in their 
analysis of optimal research contests when firms are asymmetric and this asymmetry is 
common knowledge.5  Bhattacharya and Guasch (1988) and Yun (1997) consider the 
self-selection of participants into parallel contests; in the former, workers self-select and 
the prize received depends upon a comparison with workers from the lowest ability 
contest (i.e. between cohorts), and the latter employs self-selection of two types in which 
the prize is awarded purely on the basis of a within-cohort comparison.6 
The real problem in selection contests arises if the principal is unaware of the potential 
heterogeneity of the contestants, in which case handicapping is ruled out as a mechanism. 
Furthermore, if the contestants know more about each other’s potential ability than the 
principal knows, the contest is biased. We believe that this informational asymmetry fits 
many real life situations well.  In a research contest, the providers of R&D services 
would know more about each others’ relative capabilities than would a potential buyer. 
This generates an asymmetry, which becomes a source of inefficiency, if a rank order 
contest is used as a selection device.   As an illustration, consider a research contest in 
which an R&D provider with high expected ability faces an opponent that it assesses to 
be of lower ability.  In such a situation, the high ability team has an incentive to slack off 
in the contest. This behavior arises precisely because it expects to meet an inferior 
opponent; the high ability team thus reduces its effort and its associated cost. If the R&D 
team with low expected ability turns out to be more capable than expected, then it 
benefits from the opponent’s tendency to slack off, and adopts a more aggressive stance. 
                                                 
4 “The real problem with tournaments with heterogeneous contestants arises if the contestants’ types cannot 
be identified” (McLaughlin, 1988; 248). 
5 Hence an optimal design focuses on effort in the R&D contest (more specifically the surplus offered to 
the buyer of the new technology). 
6 The aim of the principal in these papers is to induce first best effort, and the focus is not on selection per 
se. 
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As a result, the high ability contestant occasionally loses to inferior opponents. Hence, in 
instances where the agents are better informed than the principal, there is a risk of 
selecting an inferior agent.7 
It follows that running a fair contest (a contest that is symmetric with respect to the 
permutations of the contestants) does not yield first best selection in the case of 
heterogeneous contestants. However running a biased contest requires information that is 
often not available to the principal. In the present paper, we propose an alternative 
procedure based on endogenous prizes. The principal only has access to an ordinal 
comparison of the contest variable, but can make the reward contingent upon winning or 
losing.  The main conclusion is that the principal can improve selection efficiency by 
letting each contestant trade off a higher winning prize at the cost of a reduction in the 
losing prize.8 The intuition is that a contestant who faces an opponent that he expects to 
be of low ability, is willing to accept a large reduction in the losing prize for a given 
increase in the winning prize, simply because his overall winning probability is higher. 
On the other hand, a contestant who faces an opponent he believes to be of high ability is 
better off choosing a smaller gap. Consequently, giving each contestant the option of 
increasing his winning prize at the cost of a reduction in the losing prize, affects his stake 
in the contest, and hence his willingness to compete fiercely. This counteracts the 
selection bias described above; in our modified contest the bidding incentives of a high 
ability contestant are reinforced since he has more to win.9 
In Clark and Riis (2001), we analysed how a bonus system can be used in order to reduce 
the risk of selecting the inferior agent in a contest. That is, by carrying out ordinal 
comparisons of the winner’s effort with certain test standards, and rewarding the winner 
                                                 
7 This bias is acknowledged in the literature; the result is shown by for instance Amann and Leininger 
(1996). 
8 The payment structure that we suggest is simple and detail-free. 
9 O’Keeffe, Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1984) examine a related incentive mechanism in their discussion of 
self-sorting into leagues of high ability versus low ability. They point out that the “climbing-incentives”, 
which means that low ability types infiltrate “high –ability contests”, can be dampened by increasing the 
prize spread in the high ability contest (obviously, low ability types receive the loser prize more 
frequently). Another example is given by Landers et al. (1996) who focus on promotion decisions in law 
firms where there is an incentive to promote associates who have a propensity to work very hard. “Rat 
race” equilibrium occurs since the principal may use work hours as a selection device. By properly 
designing “wage-hours” packages, the principal may separate workers with low and high disutility of work. 
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adequately if these are passed, we demonstrated that the bias in favour of agents with low 
expected capability disappears. First-best selection is achieved, albeit under a restricted 
set of probability distributions: it is assumed that abilities are drawn from two uniform 
distributions that are identical up to a location shift.  The model that we present in this 
paper is a significant generalization of this work.10 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 recaps 
the selection bias that occurs in a fixed prize contest, while Section 4 presents a prize 
structure that implements perfect selection. Brief conclusions are offered in Section 5. 
 
2. The model. 
Consider a two-player contest, in which the contestant who submits the largest bid wins, 
and all bids are forfeited. The two contestants are recruited from two populations with 
identical ability distributions F(v) defined on ],0[ v , where possibly v  = ∞. Assume that 
in the process of recruiting a screening occurs that guarantees that the contestant at least 
passes a certain threshold. To be concrete, assume the single contestant is randomly 
drawn from a truncated distribution ( ) : ( ) | iiF v F v v v= ≥ . The truncation levels result 
from some stochastic process, and we denote by vH and vL the highest and lowest realized 
truncation points.  We need not further specify the exact nature of the determination of 
these cut-off points for our results to hold, and we do not consider the case in which they 
are equal since our focus is on selection in asymmetric contests (if the cut-off points are 
equal, selection efficiency is not an issue as the most able contestant typically wins the 
contest). Hence the contestant with ability drawn from the FH (v) distribution is 
expectedly superior. Each contestant knows the screening efficiency (i.e. the distribution 
of ability) of the opponent, however the principal is unaware of which group each 
contestant is recruited from; in addition, the principal does not know the thresholds 
Hv and vL.  Indeed, the aim of the paper is to develop a contest mechanism that ensures 
selection efficiency independent of the truncation levels Hv and Lv . Hence from the 
                                                 
10 Another paper that looks at pure selection in contests is Hvide and Kristiansen (2003).  Their model is 
different to those discussed above since the strategies of the participants relate to risk taking rather than 
effort level. 
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principal’s point of view the contest is symmetric; however he is aware of the fact that 
the contest is asymmetric from the contestants’ point of view, unless the thresholds 
Hv and Lv are identical.  The problem for the principal is to design a contest such that the 
winner is the higher ability participant. 
The cost of making a bid x is denoted c(x,v).  We assume that c(x,v) is continuous with 
continuous first-order derivatives, where  cv(x,v) < 0, cx(x,v)>ε > 0 and cvx(x,v) < 0, and 
that c(0,v) = 0. Hence the marginal cost, as well as the total cost of making a bid 
decreases in ability v.  It is assumed that the two contestants cannot directly report to or 
inform the principal about the differences in the shapes of the two Fi-functions, or their 
true cost c(x,v).  Information can only be transmitted indirectly in the form of contest 
effort11, where we assume that the principal obtains ordinal information only. If the 
degree of asymmetry, the ability or the cost functions are communicable (by an ordinal or 
cardinal measure) a much larger set of designs are feasible than the contest considered 
here.  
The contestant who makes the largest bid x wins and receives a prize W, whereas the 
loser receives a prize w. The difference m := W-w denotes the prize premium.  In the case 
of a draw, each contestant wins with a probability equal to 0.5. 
Since the aim of the principal is to select the agent of highest ability, it is instructive to 
first characterize the selection inefficiency that occurs in the fixed prize contest, where W 
and w are exogenously given (Section 3). Then we will show how a prize menu m(W) can 
be designed in order to ensure selection efficiency (Section 4). The idea is that each 
contestant, in addition to making a bid x, chooses an individual prize premium from the 
menu m(W).  
 
3.  The fixed prize contest. 
In the fixed prize contest, the participant that submits the highest bid wins a prize of 
value W while the loser receives w. W and w are given numbers. Denote by type H, a 
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contestant with ability drawn from the FH distribution, the distribution that has most 
weight in the upper tail, and as his opponent, type L. vH and vL denote realizations of the 
two contestants’ abilities; the realizations are private information. 
Equilibrium in the contest is characterized by two strictly increasing continuous bid 
functions, xi = bi(vi), i=H,L. Hence type H, if he submits a bid xH beats all types L of 
ability v below vLc, where vLc is determined by the inverse equilibrium bid function vLc = 
bL-1(xH). We can therefore write type H’s expected payoff as a function of the set of type 
L abilities that he beats12 and his own ability vH,  
(1)   
Pr( ) (1 Pr( )) ( , )
(1 Pr( )) ( , )
(1 ( )) ( ( ), )
( ; )
H H L H L H H
H L H H
c c
L L L L H
c
H L H
x x W x x w c x v
W x x m c x v




= > + − > −
= − − > −
= − − −
=
 
Hence, the optimal bid is implicitly determined by the critical vLc value which maximizes 
πH. Differentiating πH with respect to vLc yields the first order condition: 
(2)                       ( ) ( ( ), ) ( ) 0,c c cH L L x L L H L Lc
L




′= − =  
where a prime denotes the first order derivative. Denote by e(vH), and its inverse e-1(vLc), 
the equilibrium correspondence functions implicitly defined by bL(e) ≡ bH(v). Replacing 
vH by e-1(vLc) in type H’s first order condition (2), and vLc by e(vH ) in the corresponding 
expression for type L, yields a system of two differential equations 





c b v e v
K b b v
b v f v m
c b v e v









( ) ( )
( ( ), ( ))
( , , )
( ) ( )
( ( ), ( ))
( , , )
1
 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 Our mechanism is partly inspired by the ”Wilson Doctrine” in auction theory, i.e. the focus on detail-free 
auction rules that are independent of models specifics such as functional forms or distributions of signals, 
see Dasgupta and Maskin (1998). 
12 The probability of identical bids is zero in equilibrium, to simplify the expressions this event is 
neglected. 
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As shown in the Appendix, from the real theory of differential equations it follows that a 
unique solution [bH(v),bL(v)] on [0, ]v  of the system (3) exists, where the equilibrium 
bidding functions are strictly increasing above zero, have a common ending point x and 
where at most one agent bids zero with a strictly positive probability.   
Proposition 1 indicates the selection inefficiency in the fixed prize contest, by showing 
that the equilibrium bid function for type L lies everywhere above that of the expectedly 
superior opponent. 
Proposition 1: For all v < v  then bL(v) > bH(v).  
Proof:   
If bH(v)=bL(v), then it follows from (3) that )()( vbvb LH ′>′ . Hence bH(v) and bL(v) intersect 
at most once. As )()( vbvb LH = , the proposition follows.   
 
4. The endogenous prize contest  
If units of ability were measurable and comparable, one might consider establishing a 
direct mechanism in which the contestants truthfully reported their types on a cardinal 
scale. Based on these reports, the contest could be modified such that a first-best selection 
was implemented. However, a direct mechanism requires considerably more information 
than a contest (in addition, qualitatively different information is demanded, as reports 
have to be given on a cardinal scale). An attractive feature of rank order contests is that 
the required amount of information required is limited; decisions are made on the basis of 
ordinal information only. 
There are restrictions that limit the set of feasible mechanisms; the principal receives only 
ordinal information on bids, and he does not know which contestant, if any, is of higher 
expected ability. Hence the distribution of prizes can only be conditioned on whether a 
contestant wins or loses. Therefore, we modify the contest by introducing the choice of 
prize structure as part of the contest. To make the model as simple as possible, we assume 
the two contestants simultaneously submit, 1) a bid x and 2) a choice of prize premium 
from a menu m(W). Certainly, this can be interpreted as a sequential game, where the 
 11
contestants choose prize premiums before the contest begins, but where each contestant’s 
choice is not revealed to the opponent.  
 Assume that the contestants can choose a prize premium from a strictly convex menu 
m(W). Clearly a higher winning prize must be at the cost of a reduced losing prize, hence 
m’(W) > 1.  The contestants simultaneously choose winning prizes WH and WL and 
submit bids xH and xL. By bidding xH  H beats all L-types with ability below vLc, where vLc 
= bL-1(xH). Consider type H’s expected utility: 
(4)  ( , ; ) (1 ( )) ( ) ( ( ), )c c cH L H H H L L H L L Hv W v W F v m W c b v vπ = − − − . 
Differentiating πH with respect to WH and vLc gives the first order conditions: 
  
(5 ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ), ) ( ) 0
(5 ) 1 (1 ( )) ( ) 0
c c cH





a f v m W c b v v b v
v






′ ′= − =
′= − − =
 
which yield solutions W vH H( ) and ( )
c
L Hv v . 
Inserting H’s preferred winning prize Wi(v) from (5b) and the equilibrium 
correspondence function e(v) into (5a), and doing the same for player L, yields the 







f v m W v
c b v e v
b v
f v m W v








( ) ( ( ))
( ( ), ( ))
( )
( ) ( ( ))
( ( ), ( ))1
 
Perfect selection efficiency requires that e(v)=e-1(v)=v and bH(v)=bL(v)=b(v). Then (6) 
implies 
(7)  ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))H L L Hf v m W v f v m W v=  
                                                 
13 We have not explicitly given the first-order conditions for type L that lead to the second equation in (6) 
as they follow the same form as in equation (5).  
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which has a simple interpretation: perfect selection requires that two contestants of equal 
abilities have the same bidding incentives at the margin. This means that a type L, of 
ability v, chooses a prize premium m(WL(v)), which is proportional to the prize premium 
m(WH(v)) a type H of exactly the same ability v would choose, with the relative density 
fH(v)/fL(v) as a proportionality factor. 
We will now demonstrate that there indeed exists a menu m(W) such that the contest 
yields efficient selection independent of the truncation levels vH and vL.  Since it follows 
from (5b) that WH is strictly increasing in the win probability, FL(vL), (recall that the m(W) 
function is assumed to be increasing strictly convex) two contestants with equal win 
probabilities choose equal prize premiums. That is, ( ) ( ( ))H L kW v W h v= where the function 
hk(v) is implicitly determined by ( ) ( ( ))L H kF v F h v≡ , where the index k indicates the 











Thus k is a number between 0 and 1, where a low k implies high degree of asymmetry. 
Since ( ) ( ( ))H L kW v W h v= and fL(v)/fH(v) ≡ k per definition we can write (7) as follows: 
(8)  ( ( ( ))) ( ( ))L k Lk m W h v m W v= . 
Furthermore from the first order condition (5b), it follows that15 
(9)  '( ( ( ))) '( ( ))L k Lk m W h v m W v= . 
Combining (8) and (9) yields, 
(10)  '( ( ( ))) '( ( ))
( ( ( ))) ( ( ))
L k L
L k L
m W h v m W v
m W h v m W v
= . 
                                                 
14 Observe there is a simple relationship between hk(v) and k, since F(hk(v)) = kF(v) + 1 – k. 
15 
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1 1 1( ( )) ( ( ( ))) '( ( ))
1 ( ) 1 ( )H L k LL H
m W v m W h v m W v
F v k F v k





since hk(v) runs from v  to ∞ as k goes from 1 to 0,  it follows that the menu m(W ) must 
satisfy  
(11)  1





which gives the solution 
(12)  10( )
C Wm W C e=  




Perfect selection occurs if contestants simultaneously select contest effort x and winning 
prize W, where the latter choice is made from a menu 10( )
C Wm W C e=   where C0 and C1 
are positive constants. 
 
Inserting 10( )





1 ( ) ( ( ), )x
f vb v




with boundary condition b(vH) = 0.  Observe that all L-types of ability v ≤  vH exert zero 
effort in equilibrium, and hence so does the H-type of ability vH. 
The point here is that a contestant who considers his competitor to be an “underdog”, is 
willing to accept a small increase in the prize received as a winner as compensation for a 
given reduction in the losing prize w, simply because his winning probability is large. 
Consequently, giving each contestant the option of increasing the winning prize at the 
cost of decreasing the losing prize affects the bidding incentives. This counteracts the 
incentive bias that typically occurs in asymmetric contests, where the bidding incentives 
of “top-dogs” are poor due to the high winning probability. In our modified contest the 
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bidding incentives of an expected high ability player are reinforced since he has more to 
win.  Furthermore, the prize menu and the selection mechanism are detail-free. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The main theoretical contribution of this paper is that a principal can improve selection 
efficiency in a contest by allowing the contestants to influence the remuneration scheme. 
The solution that we have presented is simple since it involves only an ordinal 
comparison of the contest variable, and the reward schedule is independent of the specific 
details of the models such as the distribution of players’ types.  Specifically, letting the 
contestants trade off a higher winning prize at the cost of a lower losing prize achieves 
the desired result.  We have argued that the results may be of use in the design of certain 
research contests in which a fixed reward cannot achieve all of the sponsor’s aims. 
In our analysis, we have assumed that the contestants’ abilities are drawn from two 
truncated probability distributions, where the underlying distribution is the same for the 
two contestants.  A more general approach would be to specify a larger set of probability 
functions from which the two specific distributions FL and FH are drawn. In the more 
general case, perfect selection efficiency is not achievable. Still, an important insight 
holds, namely that allowing the contestants to increase their stakes in the contest tends to 
reduce the likelihood of selection inefficiency. The bidding incentives for an expectedly 
high ability player are reinforced, hence the chance that he loses against inferior 
opponents decreases. Even though the fine-tuning that is achievable in the case with a 
common underlying distribution cannot be realized in the general case, selection 
efficiency is typically improved compared to the fixed prize contest; see the discussion in 
Riis (2003). 
The specific example that we have used to motivate our results has been related to the co-
funding of R&D enterprise, but it should be clear that our results could equally as well be 
applied to an internal labour markets.  Another application of our analysis relates to 
environmental damage as described by Liston-Heyes (2001) who considers a (full 
information) contest between a firm that wants to produce a product that will damage the 
environment and an environmental pressure group that wants to stop this development.  
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The firm chooses its own level of profit from the proposed project strategically in order 
to increase its chances of being allowed to proceed with the development.  In equilibrium, 
this is shown to reduce the amount of environmental damage that occurs compared to the 
fixed prize (profit) case.  As an extension of this, one can imagine a situation with two 
firms that compete for the product development, and that their ability to limit 
environmental damage is unknown to the regulator.  Indeed, it is not unthinkable that the 
regulator may not even know which of the competitors is expected to have the better 
ability.  Given that the firm of higher ability will have lower marginal cost of “selling” its 
product to the regulator through marketing and lobbying campaigns, a smart move for the 
regulator may be to allow an endogenization of the prize structure along the lines that we 
have suggested.  A firm that will be good at limiting environmental damage from the new 
development can signal this by choosing a high profit level if successful (by, for example, 





We first show that equilibrium bidding functions are: I) strictly increasing above zero, II) 
have a common ending point and III) that at most one firm may bid zero with a strictly 
positive probability.   
I)  Assume an interval [v’,v’’] exists at which all L types in this interval bid a given 
amount z. Hence, type H’s payoff function is discontinuous and jumps upwards at xH = z. 
Consequently, type H does not make a bid just below z. Thus z may not be L’s best reply 
since type L of type v ∈ [v’,v’’]  may reduce his bid without reducing the winning 
probability. II) The ending points are common since no firm bids strictly more than the 
largest potential amount the competitor bids. III) At most one firm may bid zero with a 
strictly positive probability; otherwise each firm is better off making a small positive bid 
with certainty than by a zero bid.  
Hence, x b v b vH L= =( ) ( )  and bH(vH




H vvvv . 
There exists a unique solution of the system of differential equations (3) satisfying the 
boundary conditions. To see this, consider an arbitrary ending point ′x ; given the ending 
point the system (3) determines unique paths bi(v), i = H,L.  Then either bi(vi) ≥ 0  as in 


















It follows from the real theory of differential equations that the points at which the bi(v)-
paths (i= H,L) crosses the respective heavy lines ai – b are continuous functions of the 
chosen ending point ′x . Furthermore, choosing a ′x  close to zero certainly gives b-paths 
where bi(v) = 0 at vi > vi, i = H,L. Then if we can show that min[bH(vH),bL(vL)] ≥ 0 at a 
sufficiently large ′x , it follows by continuity that at least one x  exists such that 
min[bH(vH),bL(vL)] = 0. Due to the assumption that cx(x,v) > ε > 0, we know that 
1
( ) ( )and




x L x Hv v
f v m f v mm mdv dv
c b v e v c b v e vε ε−
   
≤ ≤   
   
∫ ∫   
Hence choosing ′x > m/ε  yields min[bH(vH),bL(vL)] ≥ 0, and a solution exists. 
It remains to be shown that the solution is unique. With our assumptions on the cost 
function, the first order derivatives of the Ki-functions, i=H,L, in the system (3), are 
continuous in all variables. Hence the solution is unique.  
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